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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILFORD LESLIE NEVES and 




BRUCE EARL WRIGHT and 
SHONNIE C. WRIGHT, his wife, 
Defendants and 
Appellants, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16910 
Plaintiffs-respondents, as buyers of real estate at 
Fillmore, Utah, corrunenced this action asking the trial Court to 
declare the purchase contract rescinded or in the alternative 
to declare that the defendants-appellants had breached the 
contract and ordering the return of the property and money 
paid by the plaintiffs-respondents buyers on the contract. 
Defendants-appellants sellers denied the breach of the contract 
or the right to rescind and counterclaimed for breach of con-
tract by the buyers for failure to meet payments under the 
contract and asking the trial court to award damages for breach 
of contract. Prior to the trial of the matter, the parties 
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stipulated for the sale of the property. The matter was tried 
on the issue of the plaintiffs right to rescind or the defen-
dants right to damages for breach of contract. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable 
George E. Ballif, who entered judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs-respondents buyers and against the defendants-appellants 
sellers. The Court entered a Memorandum decision awarding to 
plaintiffs $3,000.00 plus the cash paid under the contract 
less $200.00 per month rental for the period of occupancy. 
Based upon such decision, the plaintiffs-respondents submitted 
a judgment which included $1,918.00 attorney's fees and $604.50 
interest. Defendants-appellants made a motion to strike the 
attorney's fees. The motion was granted and after the ruling 
on attorney's fees, defendants-appellants filed their Notice 
of Appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-appellants seek to have the Supreme Court 
reverse the trial court decision and rule that the trial Court 
erred when it held that the failure of defendants-appellants to 
disclose that they did not have title to the property at the 
time of the execution of the contract gave the plaintiffs-
respondents the right to rescind the contract of sale. Defen-
dants-appellants also seek to have the Court rule that the 
plaintiffs-respondents breached the contract of sale by failing 
to make payments under the contract entitling defendants-
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respondents to damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relevant to the issues of this appeal are 
not in dispute. 
The defendant-appellant seller, Bruce Earl Wright, 
had been a stockholder of and engaged in business under the 
name of Wright's Ranch, Inc. prior to January, 1977. Such 
business was engaged in the wholesale distribution of milk 
products produced by Western General Dairies. Upon the ter-
mination of that business relationship, Western General Dairies 
entered into a lawsuit against Wright's Ranch, Inc. and against 
defendant, Bruce E. Wright (Rec. 122:17-30). Following the 
termination of Wright's Ranch, Inc., defendant-appellants moved 
to Provo, Utah County and in April of 1977 advertised their 
Fillmore property for sale. At that time, in connection with 
its lawsuit, Western General Dairies' legal counsel threatened 
to issue a Writ of Attachment against the defendant-appellants' 
Wright's home even though they had no security interest in the 
home and no judgment against the Wrights. Exhibit 10 was the 
first letter threatening attachment. Exhibit 11 was the 
second letter threatening attachment (Rec. 124:8-11). Defen-
dant-appellants, at the time they received the threats of 
attaclunent, were negotiating for the sale to the plaintiff-
respondents of their residence in Fillmore, Utah (Rec. 144:22-30, 
145:1). In the face of such threats, the defendant-appellants 
and the parents of the defendant-appellants, sought legal 
counsel as a means to protect the home for the defendants, 
-j-
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Bruce and Shonnie Wright (Rec. 149:26-29). Based upon the 
advice of counsel, the defendants, Bruce E. Wright and Shonnie 
c. Wright executed a Quit Claim Deed (Ex. 4) transferring 
the property to Bruce Wright's parents (Rec. 124:14-23). The 
deed was delivered upon an oral agreement that the parents 
would hold the property until the termination of the suit by 
Western General Dairies against Bruce Earl Wright and then 
would be deeded back to Bruce and Shonnie Wright (Rec. 139:3-14). 
Such testimony was corroborated by the testimony of the parent, 
Earl E. Wright (Rec. 150:18-21, 151:6-13). The purpose of 
the conveyance was to protect the ownership of the home for 
the defendants, Bruce Earl Wright and Shonnie Wright (Rec. 
151:11-13). No consideration was given for the execution of 
the deed and the parents of Bruce Earl Wright never claimed an 
interest in the property (Rec. 153:1-7). 
On.April 19, 1977, the plaintiff-respondents and 
defendant-appellants entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
(Ex. 9, Rec. 106:15-18). No disclosure was made to the plaintiff-
respondents by the defendant-appellants regarding the conveyance 
of the property to the parents under the oral trust to hold it 
until the termination of the litigation with Western General 
D~iries (Rec. 142:27-30, 143:1-3). Plaintiffs took possession 
and began making payments upon the purchase contract and to 
First Security Bank, the first mortgage holder. 
On May 31, 1977, the parties acquired proper legal 
descriptions, re-signed the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Ex. 
-4-
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9) as Exhibit 1 and executed an escrow agreement. They deposited 
with the escrow agent a deed to the property to be delivered 
to plaintiff-respondent buyers upon the completion of the 
purchase. In February of 1978, plaintiff-respondents became 
aware through an examination of the County Recorder's Office 
that the defendant-appellants had conveyed the property to Mr. 
Wright's parents. Through counsel, plaintiff-respondents sent 
notices that they were vacating the property and tendering the 
property back to the defendant-sellers and refusing to make 
further payments. Plaintiff-respondents' letters were received 
in evidence as Exhibits 6, 7 and 8. In June of 1978, the 
defendant-appellant sellers negotiated and obtained an order 
dismissing the Western General Dairies lawsuit as against 
Bruce E. Wright, a copy of that dismissal was received by the 
Court as Exhibit 12 (Rec. 125:13-19). In December, 1978, the 
parents of Bruce E. Wright reconveyed the property to the 
defendant-appellant sellers herein, Bruce E. Wright and 
Shonnie c. Wright (Ex. 13, Rec. 125:25-3, 126:1-6). The parents 
gave the reconveyance without consideration and under the 
terms of the oral trust agreement to hold the property for the 
beneficial interest of Bruce Earl Wright and Shonnie C. Wright 
(Rec. 151:6-13, 152:4-20). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FAILURE OF THE 
DEFEHDANT-APPELLANTS TO DISCLOSE THAT THE PROPERTY WAS 
BEING HELD IN TRUST FOR THE DEFENDAi~T-APPELLANTS BY 
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THE PARENTS OF BRUCE E. WRIGHT WAS A BREACH OF CONTRACT 
ENTITLING PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT 
The evidence presented by the defendant-,appellants 
was not challenged or disputed by the plaintiff-respondents. 
That evidence shows that prior to the time of the formalization 
of the sale to the plaintiff-respondents, and during the 
negotiations,de£endant-appellants received a threat by a 
purported creditor with whom they were in litigation. The 
creditor threatened to attach the property which defendant-
appellants were about to sell to plaintiff-respondents, (Exs. 
10 and 11). Under advice of counsel, defendant-appellants 
transferred the title to the parents of Bruce Earl Wright, 
one of the defendant-appellants, under an oral trust. The 
terms of the oral trust were that the parents would hold the 
property for the benefit of the defendant-appellants for the 
purpose of protecting the property so that a sale could be 
consununated (Rec 151:6-13, 153:1-5). Thereafter, a Real Estate 
Contract was drafted by the parties, themselves, on April 19, 
1977, for the sale of the property in accordance with its 
terms (Ex. 9). 
Subsequent to the execution of the contract, the 
plaintiff-respondent buyers entered into possession and 
commenced payments to the defendant-appellant sellers upon 
the contract and to First Security Dank, the first mortgage 
holder. Subsequent to the plaintiff-respondent buyers taking 
possession, the lawsuit against the defendant, Bruce E. Wright, 
was dismissed (Ex. 125:13-21) and thereafter the property was 
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reconveyed out of the oral trust back to the defendant-appellant 
sellers (Ex. 13, Rec. 126:2-11, 152:4-20). 
It is uncontroverted and undisputed that the purpose 
of the conveyance to Bruce Wright's parents was to protect the 
title so that it could be conveyed to the plaintiff-respondent 
buyers. The Court in this case ruled that because the defen-
dant-appellant sellers did not have title to the property in 
their own name at the time of execution of the contract, and 
their failure to disclose such fact to the plaintiff-respondent 
buyers, such facts constituted a breach of a contract entitling 
the plaintiff-respondent buyers to rescind the contract and 
entitling them to a refund of their monies paid, less the rental 
value of the property during the period of occupancy. 
In 1953, this Court spoke on just such a matter as 
to the necessity of the seller having title during the period 
of the purchase contract. The facts in that case,Woodard v. 
Allen, 1 Ut 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398, at page 22, were: 
Plaintiffs deraigned title to part of the pro-
perty by mesne conveyance, links in the chain 
of which were tax deeds from the county, which 
body, to eliminate doubt as to their validity, 
prosecuted quiet title suits, which were deter-
mined to be ineffective by the trial court 
because of defective affidavits for publica-
tion. The trial court concluded, for that 
reason, that plaintiffs had no marketable 
title and hence no right to relief. 
The Supreme court reversed the decision of the trial court and 
ruled that the evidence failed to establish by clear and con-
vincing proof the elements necessary to establish deceit in 
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regard to the executing of the contract and entitling buyers 
to rescind. The Court saying at page 221: 
We believe defendant's objections were conceived 
after the stop-payment, and were· designed to 
avoid a bargain regretted. 
The attack in that case was on the marketability of the title 
of the seller in the property during the period of the contract. 
The Court held at page 222: 
Defendant's attack on the marketability of 
plaintiff's title was premature, since, under 
the authorities, that fact is determinable, 
not as of the date of execution of the con-
tract but as of the time a vendee tenders 
that which, under the contract, would require 
the vendor to transfer not only marketable 
title, but the title which the latter agreed 
to convey. (Emphasis added) 
Even though the title had been disputed by the buyers, the Court 
went on to say: 
Under these facts, plaintiffs were not obliged 
to prove marketable title simply because defen-
dant raised the point. 
In rendering its decision in the case now before the 
Court, the trial court relied heavily upon the decision in Leavitt 
v. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220, 357 P.2d 190 (1960). The facts in 
Leavitt vs. Blohm, were that Hancocks sold to Smiths, who sold 
to Kartchner, who sold to Verda Lynn, who sold to Blohm. After 
the buyer, Blohm, entered into possession and made a down-
payment and commenced monthly payments, the seller Verda Lynn 
assigned her seller's interest in the contract to Leavitt. 
Thereafter, Hancocks, who were the original sellers brought 
an action against all parties, including Blohm, charging de-
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fault in the original contract, seeking cancellation thereof 
and forfeiture of payments as liquidated damages. Before 
trial, Hancocks renegotiated a new contract with Kartchner and 
a Cutler and thereafter, Vineyard Investment Company purchased 
the interest of Kartchner and Cutler. Leavitts claimed that 
they held the controlling interest in the corporation. However, 
there was no privity of contract between Vineyard Investment 
Company and the buyer Blohm. On the trial of the matter, the 
trial court held that the Leavitts had rendered themselves 
unable to perform under the contract with Blohm and that the 
failure of Leavitts to maintain the payments under the contract 
with Hancocks had disabled them from performing their part of 
the contract. Such acts relieved the buyers from further 
obligation under the contract. This Court, in that case held 
at page 223: 
[W]e acknowledge our accord with the rule 
relied upon by the plaintiffs that the 
vendor in a real estate contract is generally 
not obliged to have full and clear market-
able title at all times during the pendency 
of his contract of sale because, ordinarily, 
title need not be conveyed until the final 
payment is made or tendered; and we further 
agree that the purchaser cannot use a claimed 
deficiency in title as an excuse for refusing 
to keep a commitment to purchase property, as 
was attempted in the case of Woodard v. Allen. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Court then went on to state in Leavitt v. Blohm, supra, 
that those facts did not fall under the general rule. The 
Court went on to say: 
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The fact is that the Leavitts had attempted 
abortively to bring· their contract ·into good 
standing,. but had :failed. Mrs. Blohm knew that 
unless the Leavitts made their payments she was 
exposed to the risk of a judgment in the suit 
by the HancocJ:s, not only for possession of the 
property, but also for treble damages and sub-
stantial attorney•s fees. (Emphasis added) 
The Court went on to say: 
We see no impropriety in the trial court's 
view that where the Leavitts had permitted 
their interest in the property to become in-
volved in such a way that the buyer did not 
have the quiet and peaceable enjoyment of it, 
coupled with the further fact that the circum-
stances justified forebodings that they would not 
be able to extricate themselves from their 
difficulties and be in a position to convey 
title, she was not obliged to continue payments, 
but could take such measures as seemed necessary 
and prudent to protect herself. (Emphasis added) 
That is not the case now before the Court. The parties had 
not jeopardized their ability to deliver title but had enhanced 
their ability to convey the title by preventing the attachment 
of the properties that were to be conveyed and delivered upon 
completion of payments by the plaintiff-respondent buyers. 
The conveyance was an oral trust, only for the purpose of pro-
tection, and was reconveyed upon the conclusion of the litigation 
against Bruce E. Wright. No indication or involvement similar 
to the Leavitt v. Blohm case was present in this case as the 
payments were kept current upon the first mortgage. In fact, 
upon the default by the plaintiff-respondent buyers, the defen-
dant-appellant sellers met the payments to First Security Bank to 
protect the property for their own interest and as a protection 
against loss to either party in this case. In Leavitt v. Blohm, 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Court pointed out that the sellers of the property had en-
deavored to bring their contract of purchase current but had 
been unable to do so and that the buyer Blohm had been joined 
in the lawsuit of foreclosure by the Hancocks placing their 
title in jeopardy. These facts demonstrated the inability of 
the sellers of the property to convey title upon completion 
of payments by the buyer. 
In the case now before the Court, there was no such 
jeopardy of title because the property was being·held under 
the oral trust by the sellers parents so that title could be 
conveyed upon completion of the purchase by the buyers. In 
fact, long before such time of conveyance would have arrived 
under the terms of the contract, the defendant-appellant sellers 
had terminated the litigation with Western General Dairies 
favorable to themselves and had obtained the reconveyance of the 
property to themselves by the parent-trustees holding under 
the oral trust. 
The trial court holding that the failure to disclose 
the conveyance under the oral trust was a breach of contract 
is contrary to the pleadings and the evidence. There are 
no allegations in the pleadings of any failure on the part of 
defendant-appellants to perform any duty that they were to per-
form under the contract. The claim is that they did not have 
title at the time of the execution of the contract and the 
failure to disclose this entitled plaintiff-respondents to 
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rescind the contract. This is in the nature of fraud in the 
inducement or failure to disclose that which should have been 
disclosed. Such would require not only pleadings but a clear 
and convincing proof of deceit. -There is no evidence presented 
to the trial court of any deceit or of any con.tr.adiction to 
the defendant-appellants' evidence that the conveyance was in 
the nature of a trust for protection of the property and not 
in derogation of the beneficial ownership and rights of the 
defendant-appellants to be able to consummate their contract 
at the conclusion of the payments by the plaintiff-respondent 
buyers. 
It is significant that the testimony of the plaintiff-
respondents shows that when they discovered the fact that the 
defendant-appellant sellers did not have title to the property, 
they made no inquiries to determine the conditions of the parents 
of Bruce E. Wright holding title to this property or whether, 
in fact, if Bruce E. and Shonnie Wright, the defendant-appellants, 
were purchasing the property under a contract from the parents. 
As shown in the testimony of Mr. Neves (Rec. 114:13-24). 
Q. Did you ever ask them whether or not they 
had a means by which, when you had finished 
your payments, they would be able to convey 
title to you? 
A. No. 
Q. You never asked them what the reason for 
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Q. You never inquired as to whether Mr. Wright, 
Sr. was holding the property so they would be 
in a position to convey title to you? 
A. No. 
This Court has consistently held that it is not the 
obligation of the seller to have title at the time of the 
execution of the contract but at the time of the performance. 
In 1971, in Marlowe v. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 485 
P.2d 1402, the Court reiterated again its consistent holding 
on title. The facts in the Marlowe v. Radmall case are that 
the buyers entered into a contract for purchase of land with a 
fruit stand on it. Thereafter, they went to the assignee of 
the seller's interest and surrendered the keys to the fruit 
stand and declared that they were surrendering the property 
and abandoning the property. The seller made no protest. 
Thereafter, the property was mortgaged by seller to a savings 
and loan association, the mortgage was foreclosed and the 
defendant-buyers and plaintiff-sellers were both joined in the 
foreclosure. The plaintiff-sellers did not defend the suit 
and the mortgage was foreclosed. The Court held that based 
upon the failure of the seller to protect the title of the 
property and its own inability because of the foreclosure to 
convey upon completion of payments by buyers that it lost 
or encumbered its ownership so that it would not be able to 
fulfill its contract. This decision is not in contradiction 
to the prior decisions but demonstrates that in order for a 
buyer to successfully assert the inability of the seller 
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to convey title,as an excuse for the performance by the buyer 
there must be some showing of actual loss of title to the 
seller or a:n encumbrance that .jeopardizes the seller's ability 
to deliver title upon completion of payments by the buyer. 
In the case now before the Court, the conveyance under an oral 
trust to the parents was for the purpose of protecting the 
title against the threatened attachment. The conveyance into 
trust, the dismissal of the suit and the reconveyance did not 
jeopardize the ability of the sellers here to-deliver title 
upon completion of payments by plaintiff-respondent buyers 
but in fact, protected that very capability of delivering 
title upon payment. 
This issue was again addressed by the Utah Supreme 
Court in 1973 in Corporation Nine v. Taylor, and Taylor v. 
Corporation Nine, consolidated cases, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 
417, wherein the Court reaffirmed the law at page 53 as follows: 
First, the law does not require the vendor to 
have clear and marketable title at all times 
during the performance of his contract, and 
is not ordinarily so obliged until the time 
comes for him to perform. The buyer should 
not be heard to complain unless it appears 
that it will be impossible or at least highly 
unlikel that the seller will be able to per-
form his contract when.he is calle upon to 
do so, which we do not see as the situation 
here. (Emphasis added) 
It is significant in this case that when the plaintiff-
respondent buyer, Neves, who was working in Salt Lake City and 
commuting from Fillmore, Utah, discovered that the title was 
held in the name of the parents of the defendant-appellant 
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sellers, plaintiff-respondents made no inquiry whatsoever to 
determine why the parents were holding the title rather than 
the sellers with whom they had entered into contr.act (Rec. 
114:13-16, 119:9-16). Instead they unilaterally served the 
notices of abandonment of the property and refused to make 
further payments (Exs. 6, 7 and 8). They immediately ceased 
making further payments on the contract and abandoned the 
property. Upon such abandonment, defendant-appellants re-
commenced payments on the first mortgage. The parties stipulated 
that the defendant-appellant sellers should attempt to sell 
the property. This was eventually accomplished, but the sale 
was at a price approximately $3,000.00 less than the price set 
forth in Exhibit 9 because of damage allegedly caused by 
plaintiff-respondents and the change in the market during the 
interim period. Under these circumstances, the trial court 
erred in not recognizing that the conveyance under the oral 
trust did not jeopardize the title or the ability of the 
defendant-appellant sellers to convey title upon completion of 
payments. The trial court further did not acknowledge that 
the responsibility of the seller is to be able to convey title 
upon completion of payments, not to maintain ownership of the 
title during the entire term of the purchase agreement. It 
would be a rare circumstance in modern day transactions when 
the seller of property had title in its own name during the 
entire time the Uniform Real Estate Contract was in force. 
This writer alleges that it is common knowledge and this 
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court can take judicial notice that under most circumstances, 
the seller 0£ property. hasonly a buyer's interest to sell 
under his own purchase contract and he will not have title 
until mortgages running ahead of him have been paid off or 
he has completed his own purchase contract in the course of 
payments received from his buyer. The trial court was in 
error in ruling that the defendant-appellant sellers had 
jeopardized their title giving· the plaintiff-respondent buyers 
the right to rescind the contract and receive:a refund of 
amounts paid. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT.ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT SELLERS'COUNTERCLAIM FOR DA.MAGES 
At the time of the abandonment of the property by 
the plaintiff-respondent buyers, the plaintiff-respondent 
buyers ceased all payments under the contract. By such 
precipitous act in abandoning the property and ceasing pay-
ments without inquiry as to the status of title, the proper 
consummation of the transaction.was foreclosed. Simple forth-
right inquiry could have resolved such question of title. As 
pointed out in Walker v. Bintz and Shaw, Inc., 3 Utah 2nd 162, 
280 P.2d 767 (1955) at page 164: 
Even assuming the earnest money agreement 
contemplated furnishing of marketable title 
as of July 11, which we need not decide, under 
circumstances such as are extant here, the 
authorities generally allow a seller a reason-
able time within which to perfect title--a 
possibility which the plaintiff by repudiation 
foreclosed. 
, r 
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A reasonable inquiry could have resolved the entire matter with-
out the ensuing losses to either party. 
The defendant-appellant sellers then corranenced 
payments upon the first mortgage to First Security Bank, 
entered into possession to repair the property and sold it 
under terms stipulated by the parties. In so doing, the defen-
dant-appellant sellers suffered a substantial loss in cost 
of repair, payments made to First Security Bank during the 
period of the default by the plaintiff-respondent buyers 
and cost to restore the property to saleable condition. The 
trial court erred in not granting those damages as pointed out 
in Woodard v. Allen, supra, at page 222: 
The plaintiff in this case has alleged facts 
which would justify entry of judgment for 
any amount found to be due from defendant 
to plaintiff because of failure to pay 
installments past due. 
The plaintiff in this case has alleged facts which would 
justify entry of judgment for the amounts found to be damages 
by reason of plaintiff-respondents default under the contract 
for failure to pay installments due and attorney's fees. In 
the case before this Court, the defendant-appellant seller~ 
put on evidence as to the amount of damages, costs to repair 
and restore, costs of sale and diminution of sales price as a 
result of the admitted refusal of the plaintiff-respondent 
buyers to make further payments under the contract. Under 
these circumstances, the defendant-appellant sellers are 
entitled to judgment for their damages caused by the breach 
-17-
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of contract by the plaintiff-respondent buyers. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants assert that the £acts which .are not in 
dispute entitle them a decision of this Court reversing the 
trial court and remanding the case to the trial court for 
determination of the damages appellants have suffered as a 
result of the breach of contract by the plaintiff-respondents. 
Respectfully submitted: 
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